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RECENT DECISIONS
cause for the Regional Director to believe a charge that a labor
union was engaged in an unfair labor practice in violation of section
8(b) (7) (C), a temporary injunction should issue pending the final
disposition of the charge.31 Thus, it would appear that in cases
where an unfair labor practice is actually present, an injunction
should a fortiori issue.3 2 However, the Court in Penello held that
the finding of an unfair labor practice did not ipso facto make it
"just and proper" for a court to grant injunctive relief to the
victim of that practice, and that in a proper case, as in the instant
case, it would not be "just and proper" to issue an injunction.
The holding of the Court is open to the criticism that it has
assumed a legislative function and by this means has diluted the
purpose and force of a statute. The legislative history of section
8(b) (7) shows that the statute was enacted to proscribe the evil
of recognitional picketing. Section 10(1) was enacted to provide
an essential remedy for the victim of such an unfair labor practice.
By limiting the remedy provided by section 10(1), the Court in
the instant case may have mitigated the effect that Congress sought
to achieve when it enacted section 8(b) (7).
TAXATIoN - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT REQUIREn FOR
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF LumP-Sum DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE
OF EMPLOYEES' TRUST-In 1945 plaintiff's employer, the Waterman
Steamship Corporation, established a non-contributory retirement
plan for its employees. Ten years later, on May 5, 1955, C. Lee
Company purchased over ninety-nine per cent of the outstanding
stock of Waterman. A newly elected Board of Directors voted to
terminate the plan as of the date of the stock acquisition and pur-
suant to the Board's resolution, distribution was made on August 1,
1955. Subsequently, Lee merged into Waterman. The Internal
Revenue Code provides for long-term capital gains treatment of
lump-sum distributions of employees' trusts, if such distribution is
on account of the employee's death or other "separation from the
service." 1 Plaintiff brought this suit for recovery of income taxes
on the contention that the change in stock ownership, resulting in the
new management's termination of the plan, was a change of em-
ployers tantamount to a "separation from the service." In reversing
31 Ibid.
3 2 Phillips v. United Mine Workers of America, supra note 27; Compton
v. Local 346, Int'l Leather Goods Union AFL-CIO, supra note 27; Alpert
v. Local 271, Int'l Hod Carriers' Bldg., and Common Laborers' Union of
America, 198 F. Supp. 395 (D.R.I. 1961).1INT. Rsv. CoDE oF 1954, § 402(a)(2).
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the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that mere change of stock ownership and control is
not tantamount to a "separation from the service." United States v.
Johnson, 331 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1964).
Until 1942 the Internal Revenue Code made no provision for
preferential tax treatment of lump-sum distributions of employee
retirement trusts. To remedy the "bunched income" situationF
arising from such distributions, the Code was amended at that
time to provide -for long-term capital gains treatment of these lump-
sum payments. Under this amendment, that part of the amount
received in excess of the employee's contributions would be given
long-term capital gains treatment if the distribution was "paid to
the distributee within one year of the distribution on account of
the employee's separation from the service."3
The Tax Court strictly construed the meaning of "separation
from the service," and consequently long-term capital gains treat-
ment was allowed "only if the employee had been separated from
the service of the employer through retirement, discharge or res-
ignation, or because of death."'
However, a liberalization of the Tax Court's application of
preferential tax treatment occurred in Mary Miller.5 Therein the
plaintiff was an employee of the Strouss-Hirshberg Company which
was dissolved pursuant to an agreement and plan of reorganization
involving the transfer of its assets, in exchange for stock, to the
May Company. The acquiring company terminated the contributory
retirement fund. Miller, now an employee of May Company,
continued in her previous position. In applying section 165(b)
the court stated that it had no "difficulty in finding that petitioners,
on that day [the closing date], had severed connections with their
former employees .... ," 6 Thus, the court held that payments
incident to a change of employers were to be viewed as being
made on account of "separation from the service."
2The "bunched income" concept relates to a situation where an indi-
vidual receives an extraordinary amount of gross income in one year. Capital
ga.ins treatment is granted in order to provide relief from the impact of
progressive rates.3 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 165(b), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798 (1942).
In order for capital gains treatment to be available for a plan, it was
necessary that it qualify under § 165(a) as an exempt trusteed plan. See
Hess v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1959); Harry K. Oliphint,
24 T. C. 744 (1955), affd on other grounds, 234 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1956).4 E.g., Estate of Frank B. Fry, 19 T.C. 461 (1952), aff'd, 205 F2d
517 (3d Cir. 1953); Edward J. Glinske, 17 T.C. 562 (1951); 4 MERThNs,
LAW OF FEDERAL IxcOmE TAXATION § 25B.52 (rev. ed. 1960); cf. Janet H.
Gorden, 26 T.C. 763 (1956).
522 T.C. 293 (1954), aff'd, 226 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1955).61d. at 301.
[ VOL. 39
RECENT DECISIONS
Two subsequent cases, decided on the basis of the 1939 Code,
attempted to delineate Miller's scope. In Lester B. Martin7 the
court found for the taxpayer on the ground that the liquidation
of petitioner's employer corporation terminated petitioner's em-
ployment with it. To wit, "separation from the service" required
a termination of employment and that requirement had been met.
In Harry K. OliphintO the court stated that a change in stock
ownership and control did not terininate petitioner's employment
with the corporate employer. Since no "separation from the serv-
ice" was effected by the change in ownership, the distribution would
not qualify for preferential tax treatment.
The 1954 Code distinguished between distributions made on
account of the employee's death or other "separation from the
service" and distributions made as a result of "the complete ter-
mination of a plan." Where the distributions resulted from a
"separation from the service," section 402(a) (2), providing for
long-term capital gains treatment, was applicable. Where the dis-
tributions resulted from the "termination of the plan," similar
preferential tax treatment was restricted to those distributions
made during the 1954 calendar year.9 The latter was essentially
an attempt to provide preferential tax treatment for those who had
acted in reliance on Miller which had granted such treatment to
distributions made upon termination of a plan incident to a cor-
porate reorganization. °
The Internal Revenue Service, in a series of 1958 rulings,
found that there was a "separation from the service" where the
plan was discontinued incident to a sale of assets, or a liquidation
or reorganization of the employer corporation involving a real
change in the ownership of the business, even though the employees
continue in the employ of the successor." This is essentially an
expansion of the availability of long-term capital gains treatment
to distributions made after 1954 upon termination of a plan incident
to a reorganization. In other words, a "separation from the serv-
726 T.C. 100 (1956).
824 T.C. 744 (1955).
9 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 402 (e).
10See MERTNS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 25B.58; see also S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 289 (1954).
"aRev. Rul. 58-94, 1958-1 CuM. Buru 194; Rev. Rul. 58-95, 1958-1 Cum.
Bu.. 197; Rev. Rul. 58-96, 1958-1 CuM. Bui.L 200; Rev. Rul. 58-97, 1958-1
CuM. Bu.. 201; Rev. Rul. 58-98, 1958-1 Cum. BuL. 202; Rev. Rul. 58-383,
1958-2 CuM. Buu.. 149.
For an interesting discussion of the issuance of revenue rulings, see
Goodman, Pension and Profit-Sharing Rulings and Procedures, N.Y.U. 17Tr
INsT. oN FED. TAx 993, 1022 (1959). See also Sporn, Some Proposed
Revisions of the Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code Governing the
Taxation of Deferred Compensation Arrangements, 14 TAx L. Rv. 289, 306
(1959).
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ice" is said to occur when there is a mass severance of employees
from the service of the employer, as when the corporate entity
disappears through dissolution or merger.
Difficulty arose due to the Service's emphasis on change of
corporate ownership at the expense of the concept of termination
of employment. The Tax Court, in Thomas E. Judkins,1 2 consid-
ering the same trust distribution as that in the instant case, allowed
the taxpayer to treat his distributive share as a long-term capital
gain. The court found that since Judkins actually terminated his
employment with the corporate employer the distribution was made
on account of petitioner's "separation from the service." The Tax
Court seemed to indicate that a "separation from the service" could
be established on the basis of a change in ownership of the
corporation.la
The indefinite Judkins reasoning led to conflicting decisions
by two district courts. In Martin v. United States,4 a case in-
volving the identical pension plan as was under consideration in the
instant case, the court cited Judkins and the revenue rulings as
authority for the proposition that a transfer of corporate ownership
effects -a "separation from the service," and on the basis of this
authority, found for the taxpayer.
This position was rejected in Nelson v. United States.1r There
the statute's requirement that the distribution be made "on acount of
the employee's death or other separation from the service" was
interpreted by the court as requiring that "the employee must be
separated from the service of his employer either because of the
employee's death or for reasons equally definite and certain.""' They
found no "separation from the service" of the employer since the
corporate entity-as distinquished from the corporate ownership-
continued to exist and the plaintiff continued to be employed by it.
The lump-sum distributions were, therefore, held not entitled to
long-term capital gains treatment.
The Judkins reasoning, with its emphasis on change of owner-
ship, was the basis of the district court's finding for the taxpayer in
Peebles v. United States17 and Johnson v. United States.8 In each
of these cases the distribution of the Waterman plan was again
at issue.
1231 T.C. 1022 (1959).
18Id. at 1030.
14- F. Supp. - (D.C. Minn.), CCH 1963 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (63-2
U.S. Tax Cas.) V9718 (1963).15222 F. Supp. 712 (D. Idaho 1963).
' ld. at 715.
17208 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Ala. 1962), rev'd, 331 F2d 955 (5th Cir. 1964).
18 - F. Supp. -, 11 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1018 (S.D. Ala. 1963), rev'd
331 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1964).
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On appeal of these cases, the Government contended that the
distribution was based upon termination of the plan rather than
on "separation from the service," and, therefore, did not qualify
for preferential tax treatment. Conversely, the taxpayer urged
that the change in ownership of stock, which resulted in the new
management's termination of the plan, was a change in employers
tantamount to a "separation from the service."
In reversing the Johnson and Peebles decisions, the Court in
the instant case carefully analyzed the legislative history of sections
402(a) (2) and 402(e), and concluded that it showed "a manifest
congressional intent to distinguish between termination of the cor-
porate entity of the employer, as opposed to mere termination of
the plan, which is not a separation from the service." 19 There was
no indication from congressional intent that change of stock owner-
ship was to be equated with termination of the corporate entity so
as to effect a termination of employment.20 Since there was neither
a change of employers nor a change in the employee-employer
relationship, a "separation from the service" could not be found.
In the absence of the employee's "separation from the service" of
the employer, the Court found the lump-sum distribution to be
merely a consequence of the termination of the plan and thus held
that preferential tax treatment was not available.21 Petitioner's
rights, therefore, were fixed upon termination of the plan. The
subsequent merger of Lee into Waterman was an inoperative fact.
In so far as the revenue rulings emphasized change of owner-
ship at the expense of the concept of termination of employment
as the basis for preferential tax treatment, the Court found them
in error. The Court did not disagree with the results of these
ruliigs, but rather, with the basis upon which the results were
reached. The premise that a change of ownership was tantamount
to a "separation from the service" was founded on an erroneous
assumption, viz., if a change in corporate ownership was not tanta-
mount to "separation from the service" this would have the effect
of discriminating against the corporate employee.2 2 In other words,
since a change of ownership of a non-corporate business would
effect a "separation from the service" of the employer, a change
of ownership of a corporation, brought about by the sale of stock,
should have the same result. This rationale fails when -one con-
siders, as the Court did, that "the very purpose of using the
1 9 United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 943, 948 (5th Cir. 1964).
20Id. at 949. The Court also criticized Martin v. United States, - F.
Supp. - (D.C. Minn. 1963), wherein the decision was based upon the faulty
assumption that a change of corporate ownership is a. "separation from the
service." Id. at 952.21 rd. at 954.
22 Id. at 952.
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corporate form in business is to attain immortality; a bare change in
stock ownership cannot affect the corporate existence.12 3
The sole dissenter failed to discuss the concept of "change in
ownership" or that of "termination of employment," but, instead,
based his position on the taxpayer's reliance on the revenue rulings
and their binding effect upon the Internal Revenue Service.2 4 The
dissent did not consider whether or not the bases of these rulings
were valid in light of the statute.
As has been seen, the revenue rulings and the Tax Court
decisions failed to fully evaluate the legislative history in the light
of the statute. Although, as the Court in the instant case showed,
Congress intended "separation from the service" to mean "ter-
mination of employment," this was discarded for a "change of
ownership" concept. The Court found no basis, either on the face of
the statute or in its background, to justify such a shift in emphasis.
The Court has halted the unwarranted trend towards recog-
nition of a change in corporate ownership as affecting a "separation
from the service." Ergo, the distribution did not fall within the
ambit of preferential long-term capital gains treatment. The Court
found that there was neither a change in the corporate entity nor
a substantial change in the make-up of employees which could con-
stitute a termination of employment so as to fall within the concept
of "separation from the service."
The analysis of the 1958 revenue rulings undertaken by the
Court will certainly have an effect on subsequent rulings. The shift
of emphasis from corporate ownership to termination of employment
should lead to clarification by the Service of its interpretation of
the availability of preferential tax treatment under section 402(a)
(2). Although the Service may reach the same result as in the
1958 rulings, those rulings may very well be repealed due to their
faulty "change of ownership" foundation.
Because of the inherently independent nature of the Tax Court
(it is technically an independent agency in the executive branch) ,25
the effect of the Johnson decision is uncertain. The Tax Court's
position is still defined by the revenue rulings and the Judkins
reasoning, both of which gave rise to the fallacious belief that a
28"The statement that for the purpose of Section 402(a)(2) employees
of corporate employers must not be treated differently from employees of
non-corporate employers cannot be taken literally. The existence of the
corporate cloak bears directly on whether there is the 'disappearance of the
corporate entity' contemplated in the Senate Report." Id. at 951.24 1d. at 955 (dissenting opinion). Judge Gewin takes the position that
"legitimate rights may even accrue in reliance upon an unconstitutional
statute" as justification for his maintaining that the prior incorrect inter-
pretations given to § 402(a) (2) he applied in the instant case. Ibid.25 For a general discussion of the Tax Court and other agencies involved in
the field of taxation, see SURREY & WARREN, FEDMAL INcomE TAXATIoN
ch. 1 (1960 ed.).
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change of ownership would effect a "separation from the service."
But in the light of the finding by the Court in the instant case that a
change of control and stock ownership is not tantamount to a
"separation from the service," and that the taxpayer's rights were
fixed on the date of the termination of the plan, it is probable
that the Tax Court will distinguish, if not ov errule, the .udkins
case. Nevertheless, if the Tax Court fails to agree with Johnson's
re-evaluation of the intended meaning and scope of "separation
from the service," the Government may appeal as a matter of right
to the United States Courts of Appeals. The persuasive authority
of the instant case in those jurisdictions outside its own circuit
will greatly diminish the effect of any Tax Court determination
adverse to the instant case.
The Court has reassessed the availability of long-term capital
gains treatment under section 402(a) (2) by clarifying the basis
upon which the "separation from the service" concept was grounded.
This basic determination obviously requires much judicial reflection
before its full effect will be realized. Furthermore, its very fun-
damental nature emphasizes the importance of the Court's judicial
attitude that a "separation from the service" requires a "termination
of employment."
